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Abstract
We investigate the hypothesis that conditioning transfers to poor
families on school attendance leads to a reallocation of household re-
sources enhancing the human capital of the next generation, via the
e⁄ect of the conditionality on the shadow price of human capital and
(possibly) via the e⁄ect of the transfers on household bargaining. We
provide a model to study the e⁄ects of conditional transfers on intra-
household allocations, and provide suggestive evidence of the impor-
tance of price e⁄ects using data from a conditional transfer program
in Mexico.
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The design of social policies which encourage human capital accumulation
among the poor, thus breaking the transmission of poverty from one gen-
eration to the next, is a basic concern for policymakers and economists.
Roughly speaking, these policies can be classi￿ed as either ￿supply-side￿
interventions, attempting to improve the infrastructure or quality of educa-
tion, or ￿demand-side￿interventions, attempting to provide incentives for
poor parents to keep their children longer in school and engage in other
activities bolstering human capital accumulation. A large number of devel-
oping countries, including Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Bangladesh,
Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Peru, have adopted
demand-side interventions, where cash transfers to parents are conditional
on the school attendance of their children. In this paper, we provide a model
to study the e⁄ects of conditional transfers on intra-household allocations,
and provide suggestive evidence of the importance of price e⁄ects using data
from Progresa, a conditional transfer program in Mexico.
The model we propose combines elements of the household production ap-
proach pioneered by Becker (1965) and Michael and Becker (1973) and the
collective household approach developed by Chiappori (1997) and Browning
and Chiappori (1998). We treat schooling as one input in the production of
children￿ s human capital. Other important inputs are the time devoted by
family members to children￿ s human capital and the consumption of children.
By subsidizing schooling, conditional transfers reduce the shadow price of hu-
man capital acquisition. The substitution e⁄ect of transfers, then, involves
not only an increase in schooling but also in the time devoted to school home-
work and in children￿ s consumption. The impact on these other inputs may
very well precede the impact on schooling. Suppose, for instance, that condi-
tional transfers induce families which already send their children to primary
school to anticipate they will send their children also to secondary school.
Then, independently of income e⁄ects, parents will devote more resources to
children now if these resources are perceived to be complementary with more
years of schooling in the production of human capital.
Income and substitution e⁄ects are not the only potential e⁄ects of con-
ditional transfers on intra-household allocation. Conditional transfers are
1typically paid to the mother of the family. A wide empirical literature, pi-
oneered by Thomas (1990) and Schultz (1990), has shown that changes in
the household income distribution, and in particular bene￿ts oriented to
the mother, may shift household expenditure patterns in directions favor-
able to children. Thus, we treat the household as a collective entity, and
allow schooling subsidies to vary the weight of the mother￿ s preferences in
the household utility function. In the description of the model, we provide
conditions under which a higher weight of the mother￿ s preferences translates
into a shift favorable to children.1 If parents have CES preferences and the
initial bargaining power of the mother is small, these conditions entail that
the elasticity of substitution between own consumption and the consumption
and human capital of the children cannot be much smaller than one. This
implies that substitution e⁄ects cannot be small.
Substitution e⁄ects capture the mobilization of family resources toward
human capital accumulation in response to a lower price for one input, school-
ing. Note that income and bargaining e⁄ects may lead to a reallocation fa-
vorable to children even if conditional transfers have little e⁄ect on schooling
or if schooling is not perceived by families to have a signi￿cant impact on
human capital acquisition due to, say, low quality of schools available to
the poor. Isolating the e⁄ects of conditionality on intra-household alloca-
tion from income and bargaining e⁄ects gives a good indication about the
perception by bene￿ciaries of the impact of increased schooling on human
capital acquisition and hence of the impact of a conditional transfer program
on breaking the intertemporal poverty linkage.
We use data from the evaluation of Mexico￿ s conditional transfer pro-
gram, Progresa, to examine the substitution e⁄ect of the program on intra-
household allocation. Progresa provides monetary and in-kind transfers to
mothers in very poor families in exchange for regular attendance of their
children to school and periodic medical check-ups of children and adults. We
distinguish the substitution e⁄ect from the income and bargaining e⁄ects
of the program on household expenditure on child goods, which are in the
model complementary with human capital accumulation, and on household
1As opposed to what seems to be a common implicit assumption in the empirical
literature, the assumption that the marginal utility of child goods is larger for the mother
than for the father is not su¢ cient for this result.
2expenditure on adult goods, which are substitutes. Our empirical analysis
aims at a sample of households for which the income and bargaining e⁄ects
of the program are similar but which face di⁄erent schooling subsidies at the
margin. We make use of the experimental design of Progresa to identify the
substitution e⁄ect of the program. Our results are supportive of the hypoth-
esis that larger schooling subsidies at the margin lead families to spend a
larger share of resources on their children, beyond what is directly required
to satisfy conditionality.
Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1998) have combined before the
domestic production and the collective household approaches, but they do
not deal with household ￿public goods￿such as children￿ s consumption and
human capital. In a recently published paper, Blundell et al. (2005) in-
corporate household public goods in the collective household approach, and
provide marginal conditions under which an increase in the bargaining power
of a household member (say, the mother) results in an increase in the house-
hold expenditure on public goods. Our CES model illustrates that global
monotonicity with respect to the bargaining power of a household member
is nongeneric.
In related theoretical work (Martinelli and Parker 2003a), we analyzed
the welfare e⁄ects for household members of school subsidies under the as-
sumption of Nash bargaining. Our current framework is not restricted to
Nash bargaining, allows for changes in the bargaining power of adults as
a result of subsidies, and incorporates the household production of human
capital.
There are a number of evaluations of the impact of Progresa on school-
ing (for instance, Behrman, Sengupta and Todd 2005, Schultz 2004, Todd
and Wolpin 2006, and Behrman, Parker and Todd 2007) and consumption
(Hoddinott and Skou￿as 2005, Rubalcava, Teruel and Thomas 2005). None
of the studies however focuses on isolating the conditionality or price e⁄ect
from the total program e⁄ect although Todd and Wolpin (2007) carry out an
exercise comparing the impact of Progresa with and without conditionality
on schooling attainment. The overall evaluation of Progresa is summarized
in Behrman and Skou￿as (2006), Skou￿as (2004), and Parker, Rubalcava
and Teruel (2007). Parker, Rubalcava and Teruel (2007) also discuss the
evaluation of related programs.
32 The Model
Consider a household consisting of a mother, a father and a child, respectively
A, B, and C. The adults￿utility functions are separable in four basic com-
modities, A￿ s consumption (ZA), B￿ s consumption (ZB), the child￿ s current
consumption (ZC), and the child￿ s human capital (H). The adults￿utility
functions are given by
UA = UA(ZA;ZC;H) and UB = UB(ZB;ZC;H):
Note that child￿ s consumption and human capital are ￿public goods￿from
the point of view of the adults.
There are m market goods. Each household member￿ s consumption is
produced domestically using a vector of market goods and a fraction of his
or her time:
ZA = ZA(xA;tA); ZB = ZB(xB;tB); ZC = ZC(xC;tC;tAC;tBC);
where xA 2 <m
+ is the vector of market goods used in the production of ZA,
tA is the time devoted by A to the production of ZA, tAC is the time devoted
by A to the production of ZC, and similarly for the other terms.
The child￿ s human capital, in turn, is produced domestically using market
goods and the time of each household member:
H = H(xH;hA;hB;hC;e);
where xH is the vector of market goods used in the production of H, hM is
the time devoted by M = A;B;C to the production of human capital, and
e is the time spent by the child in formal education.
The endowment of each household member is T units of time, that can
be devoted to the activities mentioned before or to earn a wage in the labor
market. (This recognizes the existence of child labor.) We normalize to one
the prices of market goods and the wages that the members of the household
can earn. The household receives an unconditional transfer s0 and a subsidy
rate 0 ￿ s < 1 to formal education. Thus, the household budget constraint
is given by
1 ￿ (xA + xB + xC + xH) ￿
(T ￿ tA ￿ tAC ￿ hA) + (T ￿ tB ￿ tBC ￿ hB) + (T ￿ tC ￿ hC ￿ e) + s0 + se:
4As in the collective household approach, we assume that the household
decision is the result of maximizing
￿(s0;s)UA + (1 ￿ ￿(s0;s))UB
subject to the household budget constraint. The term ￿ is the ￿bargaining
power￿ of A. We write it as a function of s0 and s to indicate that in
principle it may be a⁄ected positively by unconditional transfers and by
school subsidies, if the family takes advantage of them.2
Under the assumption that the production of the basic commodities ex-
hibits constant returns to scale, we can de￿ne ￿commodity prices￿￿A, ￿B,
￿C, and ￿H(s) to be equal to the unitary cost of production of ZA, ZB, ZC
and H, respectively.3 We write ￿H as a function of s because the unitary
cost of production of human capital depends on the school subsidy:
￿H(s) = min
xH;hA;hB;hc;e
xH + hA + hB + hc + (1 ￿ s)e
s.t. H(xH;hA;hB;hc;e) = 1:
Note that commodity prices depend on the household production functions,
and thus they may be di⁄erent across families. The budget constraint of the
family can be written as
￿AZA + ￿BZB + ￿CZC + ￿H(s)H ￿ 3T + s0:
Our focus in this paper is on the e⁄ect of school subsidies on the house-
hold allocation via the change in the shadow price of human capital. Since
the subsidy reduces the price of human capital, an increase in the subsidy
rate will have a positive price e⁄ect on H. It seems likely that the substitu-
tion e⁄ect will be positive on the consumption of the child and negative on
the consumption of the adults. The reason for this conjecture is that child
consumption and human capital may very well be complementary from the
viewpoint of the preferences of both adults in the household. Parents may
2If the mother could divorce then conceivably the existence of the program may a⁄ect
her bargaining power even if the family does not take advantage of the program.
3The unitary costs of production of the basic commodities are given if each member
devotes some time to the labor market or if family members are good substitutes in home
production. (Otherwise, taking these prices as given is a local approximation.)
5grow fond of their children precisely while investing time and other resources
in them. Alternatively, parents who expect children to have more human
capital and hence a larger income in the future will devote more resources to
them at present to foster altruism toward parents in them.
To ￿x ideas, let the preferences of the parents be given by








for 0 6= q < 1, with 0 < ￿B < ￿A < 1. Note that the objective function
of the family has a CES form. Let ech = (￿CZC + ￿H(s)ZC)=(3T + s0) be
the expenditure share of child￿ s consumption and human capital. Using the
well-known CES demand function, we get:





￿ = (￿(1 ￿ ￿A))
1=(1￿q)￿
q=(q￿1)




+ (￿￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B)
1=(1￿q)(￿C + ￿H(s))
q=(q￿1):
The income e⁄ect on expenditure shares is zero by assumption, since CES
preferences are homothetic. Thus, the e⁄ect of a change in the subsidy rate
on the resources destined to the child can be decomposed in a substitution
e⁄ect, i.e. the change in ech due to the change in ￿H(s) holding ￿ constant
at its initial value, and a bargaining e⁄ect, i.e. the change in ech due to the
change in ￿ holding ￿H(s) constant at its ￿nal value.
Interestingly, even if the bargaining power of the mother increases with
the school subsidy, the bargaining e⁄ect is not necessarily positive. Di⁄er-
entiating ech with respect to ￿, we get that the relationship between the
resources destined to the child and the bargaining power of the mother is
inverted-U shaped if q > 0 and U-shaped if q < 0. This means that if the
family chooses a Pareto allocation and the initial bargaining power of the
mother is small, the bargaining e⁄ect is positive if and only if q > 0.











6That is, the substitution e⁄ect will be larger the larger is the substitution
elasticity between adult and children consumption in the parents￿preferences,
the closer is the intrahousehold allocation to an equal split between resources
devoted to children and resources devoted to adults, and the more elastic it
is the commodity price of human capital to the school subsidy.
In the empirical analysis that follows we attempt to estimate the substi-
tution e⁄ect of school subsidies on resources devoted to children. A crucial
problem in the analysis is that ech is not observable; we rely instead on ob-
servation of the share of expenditure devoted to children clothing. Children
clothing is a particular type of infrequent purchase, so it is likely to lead to
measuring ech with error, including zero observations that, obviously, do not
correspond to no expenditure being devoted to children. Letting Sg and Sb
be the observed expenditure share of girls￿and boys￿clothing for a given




k + ￿)=P if D > 0
0 otherwise
for k = b;g, where S￿
k is the expenditure share of clothing derived from the
household preferences, P is the probability of purchase, D is a latent variable
describing the decision to purchase and ￿ captures optimization errors and
random discrepancies in the process linking the observable variable Sk with
the latent variable S￿
k (see e.g. Blundell and Meghir 1987).
For the estimation, we assume a linear form for S￿
k in terms of the school
subsidy (approximated as the proportion of conditional income) and a num-
ber of observable variables that intend to capture heterogeneity in preferences
and in household production technology, as suggested by the model. If we
take S￿
k to be a linear ￿rst-order approximation to the expenditure share of
clothing as derived from the CES example, then the coe¢ cient of the propor-
tion of conditional income gives us the derivative of expenditure in clothing
with respect to school subsidies. Under the assumption of constant returns
to scale in the production of the basic commodities, expenditure in cloth-
ing is proportional to ech multiplied by the ratio of the price of clothing to








7and it captures the substitution e⁄ect.
Assuming that the random terms ￿ and D are independent and that
the expected values of Sk and S￿
k are equal, the equation for S￿
k can be
estimated consistently applying OLS to the entire sample, including the zero
observations, as described by Keen (1986) and Blundell and Meghir 1987).4
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Program description and data
The data we use comes from the evaluation of Progresa, the main anti-
poverty program of the Mexican Government. This program provides cash
grants to poor families in exchange for these families sending children to
school regularly and ful￿lling a schedule of family health clinic visits. The
cash grants are given directly to the mother of the family. Grant amounts for
the ￿rst semester of 1999 are detailed in Table 1. Maximum total monthly
transfers per family were restricted in the ￿rst semester of 1999 to 695 pesos;
a feature we take advantage of in the estimation.
Table 1. Monthly Cash Bene￿ts of Progresa
Grants Nutrition Grant 115
Education Grants: Grade Boys Girls




Secondary School 1 220 220
2 235 260
3 245 285
Maximum Transfer per Household 695
Avg Transfer to Eligible for Maximum 448
In Mexican pesos (1999); 10 pesos was approximately US$1. ￿ Nutrition grants￿are con-
ditional on family health clinic visits and there is no explicit or implicit monitoring of
spending in food.
4An alternative Tobit estimation leads to similar results.
8At the start of the program, Progresa carried out a social experiment in
which a random sample of 506 rural eligible communities were selected in
seven Mexican states. 320 communities (the treatment group) were assigned
to receive bene￿ts in March 1998 and the remaining (the control group) were
assigned to receive bene￿ts about two years later. The baseline household
census (ENCASEH97) was collected in November 1997. Follow-up after-
program implementation interviews (ENCEL) were carried out in October
1998, May 1999, and October 1999. These surveys contain data on schooling,
health, income and expenditures and household assets. We use the May 1999
round because it does not coincide with the beginning of the school year.
Table 2 provides pre-program descriptive statistics.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Households with Children Aged 8 to 17
Households eligible
for max bene￿ts All households
Expenditures shares (percent) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Food 67.85 18.28 68.94 17.45
Boys￿clothing 2.46 3.41 1.70 2.98
Girls￿clothing 2.27 3.30 1.59 2.73
Men￿ s clothing 1.61 2.64 1.69 3.12
Women￿ s clothing 1.29 1.99 1.56 2.76
Transport 3.73 8.44 3.54 7.50
School attendance (percent) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Children 8 to 11 97 17 95 23
Children 12 to 17 46 50 51 50
Children 12 to 17 in secondary school 26 44 31 46
Other characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Family size 8.5 2.0 6.6 2.2
Household head education (years) 2.3 2.1 2.7 2.5
Water and electricity (percent) 29.7 49.7 23.1 43.1
Dirt ￿ oor (percent) 67.4 46.9 72.7 44.5
Household head speaks
indigenous language (percent) 33.6 47.2 39.1 50.1
Proportion of conditional transfers 52.1 18.3 11.5 23.2
Expenditures shares based on the control group in 1999, which we assume represents pre-
program levels (no baseline data on expenditures was collected). All other variables based
on pre-program 1997 data for the treatment group. Proportion of conditional transfers
are calculated based on pre-program education attainment.
93.2 Empirical Speci￿cation
We estimate here how the household allocation varies with the proportion of
Progresa bene￿ts conditional to schooling. To compute a proxy for the school
subsidy at the margin of decision of the family, we take the nutrition grants
and the grants for children at the primary level to be ￿unconditional in-
come,￿and then de￿ne the di⁄erence between unconditional income and the
total maximum bene￿t, which is due to secondary school grants, as ￿condi-
tional income.￿We use the proportion of conditional income of total potential
bene￿ts as a proxy for school subsidies. Previous studies have shown high
impacts on secondary school enrollment but very low impacts of the pro-
gram on primary enrollment, mainly because primary enrollment is as high
as 96 % pre-program (Schultz 2004, Martinelli and Parker 2003b). While
there are some limited e⁄ects of the program on reducing grade repetition in
primary (Behrman, Sengupta and Todd 2005), the overall e⁄ects are small
relative to the impacts on education at the secondary level, suggesting it is
not unreasonable to treat primary grants as unconditional.
However, our measure of conditional income may overestimate conditional
income for some families because some families would enroll their children
in secondary school even without the program bene￿ts. Such families are
likely a minority; Table 2 shows that less than a third of children aged 12 to
17 are enrolled in secondary school prior to the program.5 Note that both
conditional and unconditional income refer to potential bene￿ts and not to
actually collected bene￿ts. We calculate conditional income using the ages,
gender, and schooling levels of children in 1997, just prior to program imple-
mentation. In this way, our de￿nition of conditional income is exogenous to
the program.
Variation in conditional income arises primarily from di⁄erences in chil-
dren￿ s schooling prior to the program, which a⁄ect the grants received if
children enroll in school and thus the potential amount a household might
receive from secondary school grants. Di⁄erences in children￿ s education are
not determined exclusively by age. There is substantial variation in schooling
5We carry out estimations omitting families with children enrolled in secondary school
pre-program. However, families with children in secondary school probably spend more
on their children, so omitting these families may create a selection problem. Results are
similar to those obtained from the whole sample.
10for children of the same age across families, due to late age of entry, grade
failure and repetition as well as early dropout in the communities studied.
For instance, 45 percent of 13 year old (pre-program) children had not yet
completed primary school. Thus, controlling for age and gender composition,
there is substantial variation in conditional income across families.6
We take advantage of the design feature of Progresa which limits total
bene￿t amounts per family to focus on the sample of those eligible for the
maximum bene￿ts. We argue that the income and bargaining e⁄ects of the
program are similar across families that could potentially receive the maxi-
mum level of bene￿ts and thus restricting attention to a more homogeneous
set of families we are better able to control for such e⁄ects.7 We also provide
results based on the sample of all families with children, include the maxi-
mum potential bene￿ts for each family as a control variable. While this is a
more heterogeneous sample, it is larger.
We estimate the following regression at the household level:
Shk = ￿0k + ￿1kPh + ￿2kDh + ￿3kPhDh +
P
j ￿jkXhj + ￿hk;
where Shk refers to indicator k (spending shares of adult male clothing, adult
female clothing, boys￿clothing and girls￿clothing) for family h, Ph represents
the proportion of conditional income for household h, calculated for both the
treatment and control group, Dh is an indicator of whether the household is
in the treatment group, Xhj represents the control variable j for household
h, and ￿hk is a random component re￿ ecting optimization errors, random
discrepancies in the process linking purchases to consumption of clothing
and preference heterogeneity. A suggested by the model, we include control
variables such as household demographics, household expenditure, household
assets and community level variables that are meant to capture heterogeneity
in preferences and in household production technology. The treatment group
6For families eligible for maximum bene￿ts, di⁄erences in pre-program education at-
tainment of children explain almost 60 percent of the variation in the proportion of con-
ditional income, with di⁄erences in the age and gender distribution of children explaining
the remainder.
7Families eligible for the maximum bene￿ts represent about 11 percent of all families.
They tend to have a larger family size but look fairly similar in terms of other indicators of
poverty (Table 2). Families at the maximum have a much larger proportion of conditional
income relative to all families.
11dummy captures program e⁄ects that have not been explicitly modelled; for
instance, women are required to attend monthly health lectures, which may
have had an impact on changes in diet and hence, expenditure patterns
(Hoddinott and Skou￿as 2005).
The estimator of ￿3k, the coe¢ cient of interest, is a double di⁄erence
estimator, which tests whether the e⁄ect of potential conditional income is
di⁄erent for households in the treatment group than for those in the con-
trol group. Note that we could focus on the e⁄ect of conditional income
only on households from the treatment group (in fact this gives very similar
results). However, conditional income, in addition to capturing the subsidy
e⁄ect of the program, could pick up other unobserved variables correlated
with conditional income. For instance, households with a larger proportion
of conditional income may be households with children of di⁄erent abilities
as evidenced by their previous overall achievement (and thus years of com-
pleted schooling) in school. The control group is useful for eliminating this
potential bias because the behavior of the control group should not be af-
fected by the program. If our constructed measure of conditional income also
explains expenditure patterns for the control group, this would suggest that
conditional income was picking up correlated unobserved variables.8 Inter-
acting conditional income with the treatment dummy di⁄erences out these
potential unobserved variables. That is, assuming that conditional income
provides a good measure of the subsidy rate and that the control group is
not a⁄ected by the subsidy, the estimated coe¢ cient ￿1k gives an estimate
of possible omitted variable bias.9
3.3 Results
Table 3 presents the e⁄ect of the proportion of conditional income on various
categories of expenditures shares for families with children between the ages
of 8 and 17.10 Conditional income interacted with the treatment dummy
8This may happen because conditional income is not randomly assigned, but depends
on fertility and schooling decisions prior to the program.
9Conditional income is constructed for the control group in the same way as for the
treatment group, i.e. based on pre-program schooling of children.
10We do not broaden this category to children less than 8 as program grants begin to
be received for children in third grade. It is possible that through anticipation e⁄ects the
12should show di⁄ering e⁄ects on spending on goods which are plausibly sub-
stitutes and complements with investment in children￿ s human capital. In
addition to our main sample of households eligible to receive the maximum
bene￿ts, we provide results based on an alternative sample including all
households and a control for the maximum level of grants each household
could receive.11
Results based on both samples are similar and supportive of substitution
e⁄ects. The estimated coe¢ cient of conditional income interacted with the
treatment dummy on the proportion of resources dedicated to spending on
both boys￿and girls￿clothing is positive and signi￿cant. With respect to the
magnitude of the impacts, using the sample of all households eligible for the
maximum level of bene￿ts, an increase in the share of conditional income
of about 10% (corresponding to an increase of about 35 pesos of conditional
income and a corresponding decrease in unconditional income) would increase
the share of spending on girls￿clothing by 0.2, or an increase of 9% from
pre-program levels. The results on adult male and female clothing are all
insigni￿cant, which is unfortunate since it would have provided corroborating
evidence that the increase in resources spent in children clothing results from
a reduction in resources devoted to the adults.1213
program might improve enrollment at earlier ages, although the evidence for this is limited
(Schultz 2004). Including families with children aged 6 to 17 does not change the results.
11For the ￿rst speci￿cation only, we also report coe¢ cient estimates of conditional in-
come. This represents the ￿e⁄ect￿ of conditional income for the control group. In the
absence of omitted variables correlated with conditional income, we expect this e⁄ect to
be zero.
12Tobit estimations lead to similar results for boys￿and girls￿clothing, and to negative
but insigni￿cant results for adult clothing.
13Relatedly, and equaly puzzling, Attanasio and Lechene (2002) report no e⁄ects of the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Table 4. Impact of Conditional Income on Clothing Expenditure Shares
(Controlling for the Proportion of Children Potentially in Secondary School)
Households eligible for maximum bene￿ts (May 1999)
Boys Girls Women Men
conditional income 0.050 0.030 -0.009 -0.012
￿ treatment group (0.019)** (0.020) (0.013) (0.016)
R2 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.05
Households eligible for maximum bene￿ts (October 1998)
Boys Girls Women Men
conditional income 0.041 0.036 0.014 0.005
￿ treatment group (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.011) (0.013)
R2 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.04
Households eligible for maximum bene￿ts (October 1999)
Boys Girls Women Men
conditional income 0.040 0.032 0.013 0.004
￿ treatment group (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.013) (0.011)
R2 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04
All households, controlling for maximum bene￿ts (May 1999)
Boys Girls Women Men
conditional income 0.018 0.021 0.004 -0.005
￿ treatment group (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.005)
R2 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.04
Observations: 1596, 1680, 1649 and 8610. Same controls as in Table 3, as well as the
proportion of children in secondary school age and an interaction for the proportion of
children in secondary school age with treatment.
Since the proportion of conditional income is correlated with the propor-
tion of children in secondary school, it is conceivable that we overestimate
substitution e⁄ects if, somehow, income and bargaining e⁄ects of the pro-
gram are larger for secondary school than for primary school children and
thus correlated with our conditional income measure. We thus re-run the
regressions reported in Table 3, including additional variables measuring the
proportion of children potentially (e.g. according to pre-program schooling
levels) enrolled in secondary school and its interaction with the treatment
group dummy. Results are reported in Table 4.
In spite of high collinearity between conditional income and the propor-
tion of children potentially in secondary school (0.85),14 in Table 4 we gener-
14Remaining variation in conditional income derives from gender and grade di⁄erences
in grants.
15ally continue to estimate signi￿cant e⁄ects of conditional income interacted
with the treatment dummy for spending on girl￿ s and boy￿ s clothing. As a ro-
bustness check, we have estimated the e⁄ect of the proportion of conditional
income on clothing shares for the other two available waves of after-program
interviews, corresponding to October 1998 and October 1999, with similar
results.
A ￿nal point of interest is the potential size of the substitution or condi-
tionality e⁄ect relative to the total program e⁄ect. To answer this question,
we have estimated the total program e⁄ect on household expenditures using
the sample of households eligible for the maximum amount of bene￿ts (Mar-
tinelli and Parker 2003b). The total e⁄ect of the program on the household
expenditure share of boys￿and girls￿clothing is about 0.9 percentage points.
Our estimates in Table 4 suggest that an increase of 10 percentage points in
the proportion of conditional income would increase spending on girls￿cloth-
ing by about 0.2. Conditionality seems responsible for a large percentage of
the total program e⁄ect.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the impact of school subsidies
for the poor on intra-household allocations. If schooling is an input in the
production of human capital, then school subsidies will reduce the shadow
price of human capital accumulation and henceforth lead to a reallocation of
household resources toward this activity. Thus, the model suggests that in
order to assess the impact of school subsidies on human capital accumulation
it may be useful to consider not only the direct impact on schooling but
also the impact on household expenditure patterns. However, since school
subsidies for the poor typically involve monetary transfers to the mother of
the family, the impact of the subsidies on household expenditures may be due
to the increased bargaining power of the mother rather than to the impact of
the school subsidies on the shadow price of human capital. This means that it
is important to isolate bargaining from substitution (that is, conditionality)
e⁄ects of school subsidies. A simple CES example shows that, surprisingly
enough, positive bargaining e⁄ects coupled with the assumption of e¢ cient
bargaining in the family imply strong substitution e⁄ects.
16We use data from the evaluation of Progresa, a program of school sub-
sidies for the poor in Mexico, and estimate the substitution e⁄ects of the
program. Ideally, distinguishing between conditionality and bargaining ef-
fects could be done by comparing the impact of the program on two groups
of similar households, one receiving conditional transfers and one receiving
unconditional transfers. Since that was not the social experiment conducted,
we approximate it by exploiting the fact that the program establishes a cap
to total monthly bene￿ts per household that is binding for a sample of about
1600 families. We also exploit the fact that pre-program enrollment in pri-
mary school was already very high, so the relevant margin of decision for
bene￿ciary families is whether to send (more of) their children to secondary
school. Thus, we treat primary school grants as unconditional income, and
we de￿ne conditional income as the remainder of the maximum bene￿t. Our
estimates suggest a strong e⁄ect of the proportion of unconditional income
to the maximum possible bene￿ts over household expenditure patterns. We
interpret this as evidence that the school subsidies have had an impact on
the shadow price of human capital, and that household resources beyond
those directly subject to conditionality have been reallocated favorably to
children￿ s human capital.
Some of the important e⁄ects of school subsidies involve intertemporal
incentives for household allocation. A proper consideration these incentives
requires a dynamic framework beyond what we have attempted in this paper,
and it seems an exciting avenue of theoretical and empirical research. While
we do not attempt to de￿ne an optimal level of school subsidy in this paper,
our results suggests that any such attempt should take into account the
e⁄ects of school subsidies on household allocations beyond the direct impact
on school enrollment.
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